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Does competition among persuaders increase the extent of information revealed? We study ex ante
symmetric information games where a number of senders choose what information to gather and communicate
to a receiver, who takes a non-contractible action that affects the welfare of all players. We characterize
the information revealed in pure-strategy equilibria. We consider three ways of increasing competition
among senders: (i) moving from collusive to non-cooperative play, (ii) introducing additional senders,
and (iii) decreasing the alignment of senders' preferences. For each of these notions, we establish that
increasing competition cannot decrease the amount of information revealed, and will in a certain sense
tend to increase it.
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emir.kamenica@chicagobooth.eduSuch is the irresistible nature of truth that all it asks, and all it wants, is the liberty of appearing.
-Thomas Paine
1 Introduction
Does competition among persuaders increase the amount of information revealed? A long tradition
in political and legal thought holds that the answer is yes.1 This view has motivated protection of
freedom of speech and freedom of the press,2 media ownership regulation,3 the adversarial judicial
system,4 and many other policies.
We introduce a model where several senders try to persuade a third party (\Receiver") to change
her action. The senders, who have no ex ante private information, simultaneously conduct costless
experiments that are informative about an unknown state of the world. Receiver observes the
results of these experiments and then takes a non-contractible action that aects the welfare of all
players. The state space is arbitrary but nite. Receiver and each of the senders have arbitrary,
state-dependent, utility functions.
The information revealed in an equilibrium of this game can be succinctly summarized by the
distribution of Receiver's posterior beliefs (Blackwell 1953). We refer to such a distribution as
an outcome of the game and order outcomes by informativeness according to the usual Blackwell
criterion.
We rst show that the equilibrium outcomes of our game are the same as in an alternative
model where Receiver does not observe the results of senders' experiments directly, but senders
have the ability to send veriable messages about the experiments and their outcomes. Our results
are therefore applicable to settings where senders gather information privately and have the ability
to conceal unfavorable results ex post.
We next establish a simple lemma that is the backbone of our main propositions: if the senders
other than i together induce some outcome 0, sender i can unilaterally deviate to induce some
other outcome  if and only if  is more informative than 0. The lemma captures a basic property
1Milton (1644/2006); Mill (1859/2006).
2Abrams v. United States, 250 U.S. 616 (1919); Associated Press v. United States, 326 U.S. 1 (1945).
3Federal Communications Commission (2003).
4Sward (1988).
2of information: an individual sender can unilaterally increase the amount of information being
revealed, but can never decrease it below the informational content of the other senders' signals.
This asymmetry is the fundamental reason why competition tends to increase information revelation
in our model.
Our main characterization result provides an algorithm for nding the set of equilibrium out-
comes. Throughout the paper, we focus exclusively on pure-strategy equilibria.5 We consider each
sender i's value function over Receiver's beliefs ^ vi and its concave closure Vi (the smallest concave
function everywhere above ^ vi). Kamenica and Gentzkow (forthcoming) show that a single sender
i = 1 can benet from providing additional information to Receiver if and only if ^ v1 6= V1 at
the current belief, and consequently, any belief  that Receiver holds in equilibrium must satisfy
^ v1 () = V1 (). We extend this result and establish that, when there are two or more senders,
a distribution of posteriors is an equilibrium outcome if and only if every belief  in its support
satises ^ vi() = Vi() for all i. Identifying the set of these \unimprovable" beliefs for a given
sender is often straightforward. To nd the equilibrium outcomes of the game, one simply takes
the intersection of these sets.
We then turn to the impact of competition on information revelation. We consider three ways
of increasing competition among senders: (i) moving from collusive to non-cooperative play, (ii)
introducing additional senders, and (iii) decreasing the alignment of senders' preferences. Since
there are typically many equilibrium and many collusive outcomes, we state these results in terms
of set comparisons based on the strong and the weak set orders introduced by Topkis (1978). We
show that, for all three notions of increasing competition, more competition never makes the set of
outcomes less informative (under either order).
Competition does not necessarily make the set of outcomes more informative, however, because
the set of outcomes with more competition T may not be comparable to the set of outcomes with
less competition T0. If we restrict attention to comparable outcomes, however, we obtain stronger
results. Specically, we show that for any maximal chain C, T \ C is more informative than
T0 \ C. This relationship holds in the strong set order for the comparison of collusive to non-
cooperative play, and in the weak set order for the comparisons based on number of senders and
5In Section 4, we briey discuss the complications that arise with mixed strategies.
3preference alignment. We also show that in the limit where two senders have completely opposed
preferences, full revelation is the unique equilibrium outcome as long as the value functions are
suitably nonlinear.
Finally, we discuss the precise sense in which our results on informativeness imply that com-
petition increases Receiver's welfare. We also discuss an important caveat, namely that when the
outcomes under more and less competition are non-comparable, competition may actually make
Receiver worse o.
Our paper contributes to two lines of research. Our model is an extension of the multiple-
senders persuasion game analyzed in Milgrom and Roberts (1986). We extend their results in two
directions. First, we allow senders to choose how much information to obtain before they play the
persuasion game; thus, the model in Milgrom and Roberts is a particular subgame of the game we
analyze. Second, Milgrom and Roberts identify restrictive preference conditions under which every
equilibrium is fully revealing. In contrast, we derive results on the exact informational content of
all equilibria without any assumptions about senders' preferences.6
Our model is also related to a small literature that examines situations with ex ante symmetric
information where two senders with exactly opposed interests provide costly signals about a binary
state of the world (Brocas et al. 2009, Gul and Pesendorfer 2010). The main dierence between our
model and those in this literature is that we assume signals are costless but consider a more general
setting, with an arbitrary state space, arbitrary preferences, and arbitrary signals. Moreover,
neither Brocas et al. nor Gul and Pesendorfer examine the impact of increased competition on
outcomes since this question is of less interest when senders' preferences are completely opposed.7
The remainder of the paper is structured as follows. The next section presents mathematical
preliminaries. Section 3 presents the model and the equivalence to the game with veriable signals.
Section 4 presents our main characterization result. Section 5 presents our key comparative stat-
ics. Section 6 presents applications to persuasion in courtrooms and product markets. Section 7
concludes.
6In concurrent work, Bhattacharya and Mukherjee (2011) analyze multiple-sender persuasion games when there is
uncertainty about whether each sender is informed. Under the assumption that senders' preferences are single-peaked
and symmetric, they geometrically characterize the equilibrium strategies. They establish that Receiver's payo may
be maximized when senders have identical, extreme preferences rather than opposed ones.
7A separate related literature examines the impact of conicts of interest among senders on whether there exists
a fully revealing equilibrium in cheap talk settings (e.g., Battaglini 2002).
42 Mathematical preliminaries
2.1 State space and signals
Let 
 be a nite state space. A state of the world is denoted by ! 2 
. The prior distribution on

 is denoted by 0 2 (
). Let X be a random variable which is independent of ! and uniformly
distributed on [0;1] with typical realization x. We model signals as deterministic functions of ! and
x. Formally, a signal  is a nite partition of 
[0;1] s.t.   S, where S is the set of non-empty
Lebesgue measurable subsets of 
  [0;1]. We refer to any element s 2 S as a signal realization.
With each signal  we associate an S-valued random variable that takes value s 2  when
(!;x) 2 s. Let p(sj!) = (fxj(!;x) 2 sg) and p(s) =
P
!2
 p(sj!)0 (!) where () denotes the
Lebesgue measure. For any s 2 , p(sj!) is the conditional probability of s given ! and p(s) is
the unconditional probability of s.
Our denition of a signal is somewhat non-standard because we model the source of noise, the
random variable X, explicitly. This is valuable for studying multiple senders because for any two
signals 1 and 2, our denition pins down not only their marginal distributions on S but also their
joint distribution on S  S. The joint distribution is important as it captures the extent to which
observing both 1 and 2 reveals more information than observing only 1 or 2 alone. The more
common denition of a signal, which takes the marginal distribution on S conditional on ! as the
primitive, leaves the joint informational content of two or more signals unspecied.
2.2 Lattice structure
The formulation of a signal as a partition has the additional benet of inducing an algebraic
structure on the set of signals. This structure allows us to \add" signals together and thus easily
examine their joint information content. Let  be the set of all signals. Let D denote the renement
order on , that is, 1 D 2 if every element of 1 is a subset of an element of 2. The pair (;D)
is a lattice. The join 1 _ 2 of two elements of  is dened as the supremum of f1;2g. The
meet 1 ^ 2 is the inmum of f1;2g. For any nite set (or vector)8 P we denote the join of all
its elements by _P. We write  _ P for  _ (_P).




5Note that 1 _2 is a signal that consists of signal realizations s such that s = s1 \s2 for some
s1 2 1 and s2 2 2. Hence, 1 _ 2 is the signal that yields the same information as observing
both signal 1 and signal 2. In this sense, the binary operation _ \adds" signals together.
2.3 Distributions of posteriors
A distribution of posteriors, denoted by , is an element of ((
)) that has nite support.9 A
distribution of posteriors  is Bayes-plausible if E [] = 0.





Note that the expression above does not depend on the signal; observing s from any signal  leads
to the same posterior s.
Each signal  induces a Bayes-plausible distribution of posteriors. We write hi for the dis-
tribution of posteriors induced by . It is easy to see that  = hi assigns probability  () =
P
fs2:s=g p(s) to each . Kamenica and Gentzkow (forthcoming) establish that the image of the
mapping hi is the set of all Bayes-plausible 's:
Lemma 1. (Kamenica and Gentzkow forthcoming) For any Bayes-plausible distribution of poste-
riors , there exists a  2  such that hi = .
We dene a conditional distribution of posteriors hjsi to be the distribution of posteriors
induced by observing signal  after having previously observed some signal realization s with




p(s) to each belief . For any
 and s with p(s) > 0, we have Ehjsi [] = s. Lemma 1 can easily be extended to conditional
distributions of posteriors:
Lemma 2. For any s s.t. p(s) > 0 and any distribution of posteriors  s.t. E [] = s, there
exists a  2  such that  = hjsi.
9The fact that distributions of posteriors have nite support follows from the assumption that each signal has
nitely many realizations. The focus on such signals is without loss of generality under the maintained assumption
that 
 is nite.
10For those s with p(s) = 0, set s to be an arbitrary belief.
6Proof. Given any s s.t. p(s) > 0 and any distribution of posteriors  s.t. E [] = s, let S0 be







s(!) (s!). This is possible because E [] = s implies
P




!) = (s!). For each  2 Supp(), let
s = [!s

!. Note that S0 = fsj 2 Supp()g is a partition of s. Let  = S0 [ ff
  [0;1] n fsggg.
It is easy to check that  = hjsi.
Note that Lemma 1 is a Corollary of Lemma 2 as we can set s in the statement of Lemma 2 to
equal 
  [0;1] so that s = 0.
2.4 Informativeness
We order distributions of posteriors by informativeness in the sense of Blackwell (1953). We say
that  is more informative than 0, denoted  % 0, if for some  and 0 s.t.  = hi and
0 = h0i, there exists a garbling g : S  S ! [0;1] such that
P
s020 g (s0;s) = 1 for all s 2 , and
p(s0j!) =
P
s2 g (s0;s)p(sj!) for all ! and all s0 2 0. The relation % is a partial order. The pair
(((
));%) is a bounded lattice. We refer to its minimum element as no revelation, denoted
. Distribution  places probability one on the prior. The maximum element is full revelation,
denoted . Distribution  has only degenerate beliefs in its support.11
The renement order on the space of signals implies the informativeness order on the space of
distributions of posteriors:
Lemma 3.  D 0 ) hi % h0i.
Proof. Dene g (s0;s) equal to 1 if s  s0, and equal to 0 otherwise. Given any  and 0 s.t.
 D 0, we know that for each s 2 , there is exactly one s0 2 0 s.t. s  s0. Hence, for
all s,
P
s020 g (s0;s) = 1. Moreover,  D 0 implies that [fs 2  : s  s0g = s0. Hence, for




Note that it is not true that hi % h0i )  D 0. Note also that Lemma 3 implies h1 _ 2i %
h1i;h2i.
11A belief is degenerate if it places positive probability only on a single state.
7We establish one more relationship between D and %.
Lemma 4. For any ;0; and  s.t. 0 %  and hi = , 90 s.t. 0 D  and h0i = 0.
Proof. Consider any ;0; and  s.t. 0 %  and hi = . By Lemma 1, there is a ^  such that
h^ i = 0. Hence, by denition of %, there is a garbling g such that p(sj!) =
P
^ s2^  g (s; ^ s)p(^ sj!)
for all s 2  and !. Dene a new signal 0 D  as follows. For each s 2 , for each ! 2 
, let
s! = fxj(!;x) 2 sg. Now, dene a partition of each s! such that each element of the partition,
say s0 (s; ^ s;!), is associated with a distinct ^ s 2 ^  and has Lebesgue measure g (s; ^ s)p(^ sj!). This
is possible since the sum of these measures is p(sj!) = (s!). Let s0 (s; ^ s) = [!s0 (s; ^ s;!). Let
0 = fs0 (s; ^ s)j^ s 2 ^ ;s 2 g. For any s; ^ s;!1;!2, we have
p(s0 (s; ^ s)j!1)
p(s0 (s; ^ s)j!2)
=
g (s; ^ s)p(^ sj!1)





which implies h0i = h^ i = 0.
Note that it is not true that for any 0 %  and h0i = 0; 9 s.t. 0 D  and hi = .
2.5 Orders on sets
We will frequently need to compare the informativeness of sets of outcomes. Topkis (1978, 1998)
denes two orders on subsets of a lattice. Given two subsets Y and Y 0 of a lattice (Y;), consider
two properties of a pair y;y0 2 Y:
(S) y _ y0 2 Y and y ^ y0 2 Y 0
(W) 9^ y 2 Y : ^ y  y0 and 9^ y0 2 Y 0 : y  ^ y0
Topkis denes Y to be strongly above Y 0 (Y s Y 0) if property S holds for any y 2 Y and y0 2 Y 0,
and to be weakly above Y 0 (Y w Y 0) if property W holds for any y 2 Y and y0 2 Y 0.
Given two sets of outcomes T and T0, we thus say T is strongly more informative than T0 if
T %s T0, and T is weakly more informative than T0 if T %w T0. Some of our results will establish
that a particular set cannot be strictly less informative than another set. To simplify the statement
of those propositions, we say that T is no less informative than T0 if T is not strictly less informative
8than T0 in the weak order. As long as T and T0 are not empty, as will be the case in our application,
this implies that T is not strictly less informative than T0 in the strong order, and it implies that
if T and T0 are strongly (weakly) comparable, then T is strongly (weakly) more informative.
Both the strong and the weak order are partial. Broadly speaking, there are two ways that sets
Y and Y 0 can fail to be ordered. The rst arises because one set has elements that are ordered both
above and below the elements of the other set. For example, suppose that max(Y ) > max(Y 0)
but min(Y ) < min(Y 0). Then, sets Y and Y 0 are not comparable in either the strong or the weak
order, as seems intuitive. The second way that two sets can fail to be comparable arises because
individual elements of the two sets are themselves not comparable. For example, suppose that
Y s Y 0 and ~ y 2 Y is not comparable to any element of Y [ Y 0. Then Y [ ~ y is not comparable to
Y 0 in either the strong or the weak order. The intuitive basis for calling Y [ ~ y and Y 0 unordered
may seem weaker than in the rst case, and in some contexts we might be willing to say that Y [ ~ y
is above Y 0.
In the analysis below, we will frequently encounter sets that fail to be ordered only in the latter
sense. It will therefore be useful to distinguish these cases from those where sets are unordered
even when we restrict attention to their comparable elements. Recalling that a chain is a set in
which any two elements are comparable, and a chain is maximal if it is not a strict subset of any
other chain, we say that Y is strongly above Y 0 along chains if for any maximal chain C  Y that
intersects both Y and Y 0, Y \C s Y 0 \C.12 We say Y is weakly above Y 0 along chains if for any
such C, Y \ C w Y 0 \ C.
To gain more intuition about orders along chains, consider again properties S and W. When
Y is above Y 0 in the strong (weak) order, property S (W) holds for any y 2 Y and y0 2 Y 0. When
Y is above Y 0 in the strong (weak) order along chains, property S (W) holds for any comparable y
and y0.
Orders along chains also arise naturally in decision theory. The standard result on monotone
comparative statics (Milgrom and Shannon 1994) states that, given a lattice (Y;) and a poset
Z, argmaxy2Y f (y;z) is monotone nondecreasing in z in the strong set order if and only if f (;)
12Given any two sets Y and Y
0, the following three statements are equivalent: (i) for any maximal chain C,
Y \C s Y
0 \C, (ii) for any chain C s.t. jCj = 2, Y \C s Y
0 \C, and (iii) for any chain C, Y \C s Y
0 \C, and
9satises the single-crossing property13 and f (;z) is quasisupermodular14 for any z. It turns out
that if we drop the requirement of quasisupermodularity, we obtain monotone comparative statics
in the strong order along chains:15
Remark 1. Given a lattice (Y;) and a poset Z, argmaxy2Y f (y;z) is monotone nondecreasing in
z in the strong set order along chains if and only if f (;) satises the single-crossing property.
3 Bayesian persuasion with multiple senders
3.1 The model
Receiver has a continuous utility function u(a;!) that depends on her action a 2 A and the state
of the world ! 2 
. There are n  1 senders indexed by i. Each sender i has a continuous utility
function vi (a;!) that depends on Receiver's action and the state of the world. All senders and
Receiver share the prior 0. The action space A is compact.
The game has three stages: Each sender i simultaneously chooses a signal i from . Next,
Receiver observes the signal realizations fsig
n
i=1. Finally, Receiver chooses an action.
Receiver forms her posterior using Bayes' rule; hence her belief after observing the signal real-
izations is s where s = \n
i=1si. She chooses an action that maximizes Esu(a;!). It is possible for
Receiver to have multiple optimal actions at a given belief, but for ease of exposition we suppose
that Receiver takes a single action a () at each belief . In section 4 we discuss how our results
can be restated to account for the multiplicity of optimal actions.
We denote sender i's expected utility when Receiver's belief is  by ^ vi ():
^ vi ()  Evi (a ();!):
Throughout the paper, we focus exclusively on pure-strategy equilibria. We denote a strategy
13Function f:Y Z ! R satises the single-crossing property if y > y
0 and z > z
0 implies that f (y;z
0)  f (y
0;z
0) )
f (y;z)  f (y
0;z) and f (y;z
0) > f (y
0;z
0) ) f (y;z) > f (y
0;z).
14Function f : Y ! R is quasisupermodular if f (y)  f (y ^ y
0) ) f (y _ y
0)  f (y
0) and f (y) > f (y ^ y
0) )
f (y _ y
0) > f (y
0).
15We thank John Quah for this observation.
10prole by  = (1;:::;n) and let  i = (1;:::i 1;i+1;:::;n). A prole  is an equilibrium if
Eh_i^ vi ()  Eh0
i_ ii^ vi () 80
i 2  8i:
We refer to Receiver's equilibrium distribution of posteriors as the outcome of the game.16 We say
a belief  is induced in an equilibrium if it is in the support of the equilibrium outcome.
3.2 Discussion of the model
Our model makes several strong assumptions.
First, we assume that signals are costless and that each sender can choose any signal whatsoever.
This assumption would be violated if dierent senders had comparative advantage in accessing
certain kinds of information, if there were some information that senders could not avoid learning,
or if the experimental technology were coarse.
Second, our model implicitly allows each sender to choose a signal whose realizations are arbi-
trarily correlated, conditional on !, with the signal realizations of the other senders. This would
not be possible if signal realizations were aected by some idiosyncratic noise. One way to motivate
our assumption is to consider a setting in which there is an exogenous set of experiments about
! and each sender's strategy is simply a mapping from the outcomes of those experiments to a
message space. In that case, each sender can make his messages correlated with those of other
senders. Another setting in which senders can choose correlated signals is one where they move
sequentially. In that case, each sender can condition his choice of the signal on the realizations of
the previous signals. The sequential move version of the game, however, is more cumbersome to
analyze as the outcomes depend on the order in which senders move.17
Third, it is important that senders do not have any private information at the time they choose
their signal. If they did, their choice of the signal could convey information conditional on the
signal realization, and this would substantially complicate the analysis.
16It is easy to see that Receiver's distribution of posteriors determines the distribution of Receiver's actions and
the payos of all the players. The fact that each sender's payo is entirely determined by the aggregate signal _
provides a link between our model and the literature on aggregate games (Martimort and Stole 2010).
17There is nonetheless a connection between the simultaneous and the sequential move games. If  is an equilibrium
outcome of the sequential move game for all orders of moves by the senders, then  obeys the characterization from
Proposition 2.
11Fourth, we assume that Receiver is a classical Bayesian who can costlessly process all information
she receives. The main import of this assumption is that no sender can drown out the information
provided by others, say by sending many useless messages. From Receiver's point of view, the worst
thing that any sender can do is to provide no information. Hence, unlike in a setting with costly
information processing, our model induces an asymmetry whereby each sender can add to but not
detract from the information provided by others.
The four assumptions above not only make the model more tractable, but are required for our
main results to hold. We also make several assumptions that are not necessary for the results, but
greatly simplify the exposition.
First, our model assumes that Receiver directly observes the realizations of senders' signals.
This is a strong assumption, equivalent to allowing each sender to commit to report the realization
of his signal truthfully. As it turns out, however, all of our results hold under a weaker assumption
that senders can make veriable claims about their signals.
To show this formally, we will refer to the game in our model as the observable signal game.
We dene an alternative game, the veriable message game, with the following stages: (i) each
sender simultaneously chooses a signal i, the choice of which is not observed by Receiver or the
other senders; (ii) each sender privately observes the realization si of his own signal; (iii) each
sender simultaneously sends a veriable message mi  S s.t. si 2 mi; (iv) Receiver observes all the
messages; (v) Receiver chooses an action.
Proposition 1. The set of sequential equilibrium outcomes of the veriable message game coincides
with the set of equilibrium outcomes of the observable signal game.
A proof of the proposition is in the Appendix.18 Proposition 1 implies that our results are
applicable even in settings where realizations of senders' signals are not directly observable by
Receiver and senders are able to conceal unfavorable information ex post. The key assumption we
do need to make is that senders have the ability to send veriable messages. This distinguishes our
setting from cheap talk.
18Proposition 1 is reminiscent of the unraveling results in Milgrom (1981), Grossman (1981), and Milgrom and
Roberts (1986). It is stronger in a certain sense, however, as we do not impose a monotonicity condition on senders'
preferences. The reason for the dierence is that we only need to establish full revelation in the messaging game
following a signal i which was optimal for sender i, whereas the aforementioned papers characterize the equilibrium
following a fully informative signal.
12Second, it is easy to extend our results to situations where Receiver has private information.
Suppose that, at the outset of the game, Receiver privately observes a realization r from some signal
 (j!). In that case, Receiver's action, a (s;r), depends on the realization of her private signal
and is thus stochastic from senders' perspective. However, given a signal realization s, each sender
simply assigns the probability  (rj!)s (!) to the event that Receiver's signal is r and the state




r v (a (s;r);!) (rj!)s (!). All
the results then apply directly with respect to the re-formulated ^ vi's.
Finally, we present the model as if there were a single Receiver, but an alternative way to
interpret our setting is to suppose there are several receivers j = 1;::;m, each with a utility function
uj (aj;!), with receiver j taking action aj 2 Aj, and all receivers observing the realizations of all
senders' signals. Even if each sender's utility vi (a;!) depends in an arbitrary way on the full
vector of receivers' actions a = (a1;:::;am), our analysis still applies directly since, from senders'
perspective, the situation is exactly the same as if there were a single Receiver maximizing u(a;!) =
Pm
j=1 uj (aj;!).
4 Characterizing equilibrium outcomes
In this section, we characterize the set of equilibrium outcomes. As a rst step, consider the set of
distributions of posteriors that a given sender can induce given the strategies of the other senders.
It is immediate that he can only induce a distribution of posteriors that is more informative than
the one induced by his opponents' signals alone. The following lemma establishes that he can
induce any such distribution.
Lemma 5. Given a strategy prole  and a distribution of posteriors , for any sender i there
exists a 0
i 2  such that h0
i _  ii =  if and only if  % h_ ii.
Proof. Suppose  % h_ ii. By Lemma 4, there exists a 0
i D _ i s.t. h0
ii = . Since 0
i =
0
i _  i, we know h0
i _  ii = h0
ii = . The converse follows from Lemma 3.
This lemma highlights a fundamental property of information: an individual sender can uni-
laterally increase the amount of information being revealed, but can never decrease it below the
13informational content of the other senders' signals. This asymmetry is central to the intuitions we
develop below on why competition tends to increase information revelation.
Lemma 5 depends on our assumption that each sender can choose a signal whose realizations
are arbitrarily correlated, conditional on !, with the signal realizations of the other senders. As a
result, when senders can choose mixed strategies, the analogue of this lemma does not hold. That
is, it is possible to construct an example where the senders other than i are playing mixed strategies
~  i, there is a distribution of posteriors  % h_~  ii, and there is no 0
i such that h0
i _  ii = .19
The failure of this lemma means that the analytical approach we apply in our main results below
cannot be directly extended to characterize the set of mixed strategy equilibria.
We next turn to the question of when a given sender would wish to deviate to some more
informative . For each i, let Vi be the concave closure of ^ vi:
Vi ()  supfzj(;z) 2 co(^ vi)g;
where co(^ vi) denotes the convex hull of the graph of ^ vi. Note that each Vi is concave by construction.
In fact, it is the smallest concave function that is everywhere weakly greater than ^ vi. Kamenica
and Gentzkow (forthcoming) establish that when there is only a single sender i and the current
belief is , Vi() is the greatest payo that the sender can achieve.
Lemma 6. (Kamenica and Gentzkow forthcoming) For any belief , ^ vi () = Vi () if and only if
E [^ vi (0)]  ^ vi () for all  such that E [0] = .
In light of this lemma, we refer to a belief  such that ^ vi () = Vi () as unimprovable for sender
i. Let Mi denote the set of unimprovable beliefs for sender i.
The lemma above establishes that, if there is a single sender, any belief induced in equilibrium
has to be unimprovable for that sender. Our main characterization result shows that when n  2,
any belief induced in equilibrium has to be unimprovable for all senders. Moreover, unlike in the
single sender case, this condition is not only necessary but sucient: for any Bayes-plausible 




Mi, there exists an equilibrium that induces .
19Here, we extend the notation hi to denote the distribution of posteriors induced by a mixed strategy prole.
14Proposition 2. Suppose n  2. A Bayes-plausible distribution of posteriors  is an equilibrium
outcome if and only if each belief in its support is unimprovable for each sender.
We provide a sketch of the proof here; a more detailed argument is in the Appendix. Suppose
that  is an equilibrium outcome. If there were some  2 Supp() such that ^ vi () 6= Vi ()
for some sender i, Lemmas 5 and 6 imply that sender i could protably deviate by providing
additional information when the realization of  is . Conversely, suppose that  is a Bayes-plausible
distribution of beliefs such that for each  2 Supp(), ^ vi () = Vi () for all i. Consider the strategy
prole where all senders send the same signal  with hi = . No sender can then deviate to induce
any 0  . Moreover, the fact that all beliefs in the support of  are unimprovable means that no
sender would want to deviate to any 0  . Thus, this strategy prole is an equilibrium.
An important feature of Proposition 2 is that it provides a way to solve for the informational
content of equilibria simply by inspecting each sender's preferences in turn, without worrying about
xed points or strategic considerations. This is particularly useful because identifying the set of
unimprovable beliefs for each sender is typically straightforward. In Section 6, we will use this
characterization to develop some applications. For now, Figure 1 illustrates how Proposition 2
can be applied in a simple example with hypothetical value functions. In this example, there are
two senders, A and B. Panel (a) displays ^ vA and VA, while Panel (b) displays ^ vB and VB. Panel
(c) shows the sets of unimprovable beliefs MA and MB, as well as their intersection M. Any
distribution of beliefs with support in M is an equilibrium outcome. A belief such as 1 cannot
be induced in equilibrium because sender A would have a protable deviation. A belief such as 2
cannot be induced in equilibrium because sender B would have a protable deviation.
Recall that, for ease of exposition, we have been taking some optimal a () as given and focusing
on the game between senders. Proposition 2 thus characterizes the set of equilibrium outcomes
consistent with this particular strategy by Receiver. To take the multiplicity of Receiver-optimal
strategies into account, we could dene a separate set of value functions ^ v
i () for each Receiver-
optimal strategy . Then, a distribution of posteriors  is an equilibrium outcome if and only if
there is an optimal action strategy  such that the support of  lies in \i fj^ v
i () = V 
i ()g.
Finally, observe that full revelation is an equilibrium in the example of Figure 1 (both  = 0
and  = 1 are in M). This is true whenever there are multiple senders, because degenerate beliefs
15Figure 1: Characterizing equilibrium outcomes
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16are always unimprovable. This also implies that an equilibrium always exists.20
Corollary 1. If n  2, full revelation is an equilibrium outcome.
As Sobel (2010) discusses, the existence of fully revealing equilibria under weak conditions is a
common feature of multi-sender strategic communication models. In many of these models, as in
ours, full revelation can be an equilibrium outcome even if all senders have identical preferences and
strictly prefer no information disclosure to all other outcomes { a seemingly unappealing prediction.
One response would be to introduce a selection criterion that eliminates such equilibria. Given
any two comparable equilibrium outcomes, every sender weakly prefers the less informative one.
Hence, while the appropriate selection criterion might depend on the setting, selection criteria that
always pick out a minimally informative equilibrium are appealing. We discuss the implications of
such a selection criterion in Section 5.4 below. The approach we take in our formal results, however,
is to focus on set comparisons of the full range of equilibrium outcomes.
5 Competition and information revelation
5.1 Comparing competitive and collusive outcomes
One way to vary the extent of competition is to compare the set of non-cooperative equilibria to
what senders would choose if they could get together and collude. This might be the relevant
counterfactual for analyzing media ownership regulation or the eect of mergers on disclosure.
An outcome  is collusive if  2 argmax0 E0 (
P
^ vi ()). Note that it is without loss of
generality to assume that, in choosing the collusive outcome, senders put equal weight on each
player's utility; if, say due to dierences in bargaining power, the collusive agreement placed weight
i on sender i, we could simply redene each vi as ivi.
Proposition 3. Let T be the set of equilibrium outcomes and Tc the set of collusive outcomes. T
is no less informative than Tc. Moreover, T is strongly more informative than Tc along chains.
If there is a single sender, the proposition holds trivially as T = Tc, so suppose throughout
this subsection that n  2. We begin the proof with the following Lemma.
20Kamenica and Gentzkow (forthcoming) establish existence for the case n = 1. Consider an a
 () where Receiver
takes a Sender-preferred optimal action at each belief. Such an a
 () guarantees that ^ vi is upper semicontinuous and
thus that an equilibrium exists.
17Lemma 7. If  2 T; c 2 Tc; and c % , then c 2 T and  2 Tc.
Proof. Suppose  2 T; c 2 Tc; and c % . By Lemma 5, we know Ec [^ vi ()]  E [^ vi ()]
for all i; otherwise, the sender i for whom Ec [^ vi ()] > E [^ vi ()] could protably deviate to c.
Since c 2 Tc, we know Ec (
P
^ vi ())  E (
P
^ vi ()). Therefore, Ec [^ vi ()] = E [^ vi ()] for
all i which implies  2 Tc. Now, we know c 2 T unless there is a sender i and a distribution of
posteriors 0 % c s.t. E0 [^ vi ()] > Ec [^ vi ()]. But since  2 T, Ec [^ vi ()] = E [^ vi ()], and
0 % c % , this cannot be.
Lemma 7 establishes one sense in which competition increases the amount of information re-
vealed: no non-collusive equilibrium outcome is less informative than a collusive outcome, and no
equilibrium outcome is less informative than a non-equilibrium collusive outcome. The lemma also
plays a central role in the proof of Proposition 3:
Proof. Suppose Tc %w T. To establish that T is no less informative than Tc; we need to show
this implies T %w Tc. For any c 2 Tc, we know by Corollary 1 there exists  2 T such that
 % c. For any  2 T, Tc %w T implies there is a 0 2 Tc s.t. 0 % . By Lemma 7, we must
then have  2 Tc. Thus, there is a c 2 Tc; namely , s.t. c - . Now, consider any maximal
chain C that intersects T and T0. Consider any  2 T \ C and any c 2 Tc \ C: By Lemma 7,
 _ c 2 T \ C and  ^ c 2 Tc \ C. Therefore, T \ C %s Tc \ C.
Note that the proposition allows for T to be non-comparable to Tc. The two sets can indeed
be non-comparable in both the strong and the weak order. We will discuss the importance of these
caveats below when we analyze whether competition necessarily makes Receiver better o.
5.2 Varying the number of senders
A second way to vary the extent of competition is to compare the set of equilibria with many
senders to the set of equilibria with fewer senders. This might be the relevant counterfactual for
assessing the impact of lowering barriers to entry on equilibrium advertising in an industry.
Proposition 4. Let T and T0 be the sets of equilibrium outcomes when the sets of senders are J
and J0  J, respectively. T is no less informative than T0. Moreover, T is weakly more informative
than T0 along chains.
18The basic intuition behind this proposition is somewhat dierent when we consider a change
from a single sender to many senders (i.e., when jJ0j = 1) and when we consider the change from
many senders to more senders (i.e., when jJ0j > 1). The result is easiest to see when jJ0j > 1.
In that case, Proposition 2 implies that T  T0. In other words, adding senders causes the set
of equilibrium outcomes to shrink. But, Corollary 1 implies that, even as the set of equilibrium
outcomes shrinks, full revelation must remain in the set. Hence, loosely speaking, adding senders
causes the set of equilibrium outcomes to shrink \toward" full revelation.
To formalize this intuition, we begin with a lemma that will also be useful in establishing
Proposition 5 below.
Lemma 8. Suppose T and T0 are sets of outcomes s.t. T  T0 and  2 T. Then T is no less
informative than T0, and T is weakly more informative than T0 along chains.
Proof. Suppose T and T0 are sets of outcomes s.t. T  T0 and  2 T. Suppose T0 %w T. To
establish that T is no less informative than T0, we need to show this implies T %w T0. For any
0 2 T0, we know there exists  2 T, namely , such that  % 0. For any  2 T, there exists a
0 2 T0, namely  2 T  T0, such that  % 0. Now, consider any maximal chain C that intersects
T0. Since C is maximal, it must include . Moreover,  2 T. Hence, for any 0 2 T0 \ C there is a
 2 T\C, namely ; s.t.  % 0. For any  2 T\C there is a 0 2 T0\C, namely  2 T\C  T0\C,
such that  % 0.
We now turn to the proof of Proposition 4.
Proof. If J is a singleton, the proposition holds trivially, so suppose that jJj  2. First consider
the case where jJ0j = 1. Let i denote the sender in J0. Suppose T0 %w T. To establish that T is no
less informative than T0, we need to show this implies T %w T0. By Corollary 1, for any 0 2 T0, we
know there exists  2 T, namely , such that  % 0. Given any  2 T, T0 %w T implies there is a
0 2 T0 s.t. 0 % . But, then it must be the case that  is also individually optimal for sender i, i.e.,
 2 T0; otherwise, by Lemma 5, sender i could protably deviate to 0 and hence  would not be an
equilibrium. Now, consider any maximal chain C that intersects T0. Since C is maximal, it must
include . Moreover,  2 T. Hence, for any 0 2 T0 \C there is a  2 T \C, namely ; s.t.  % 0.
It remains to show that for any  2 T \ C there is a 0 2 T0 \ C s.t.  % 0. Given any  2 T \ C,
19since C is a chain, every element of T0 \ C is comparable to . Consider any 0 2 T0 \ C. Since T0
intersects C, there must be some such 0. If 0 - , we are done. Suppose 0 % . Then, it must be
the case that  is also individually optimal for sender i, i.e.,  2 T0; otherwise, by Lemma 5, sender
i could protably deviate to 0 and hence  would not be an equilibrium. Finally, consider there
case where jJ0j > 1. In that case, by Proposition 2, T  T0, and by Corollary 1,  2 T. Hence, the
proposition follows directly from Lemma 8.
5.3 Varying the alignment of senders' preferences
A third way to vary the extent of the competition is to make senders' preferences more or less
aligned. This counterfactual sheds lights on the ecacy of adversarial judicial systems and advocacy
more broadly (Dewatripont and Tirole 1999).
Given senders can have any arbitrary state-dependent utility functions, the extent of preference
alignment among senders is not easy to parametrize in general. Hence, we consider a specic form
of preference alignment: given any two functions f;g : A  




collection of preferences where some two senders, say j and k, have preferences of the form
vj (a;!) = f (a;!) + bg (a;!)
vk (a;!) = f (a;!)   bg (a;!)
while preferences of Receiver and of other senders are independent of b. The parameter b thus
captures the extent of preference misalignment between two of the senders.
Proposition 5. Let T and T0 be the sets of equilibrium outcomes when preferences are vb and vb0
,
respectively, where b > b0. T is no less informative than T0. Moreover, T is weakly more informative
than T0 along chains.
Proof. For each i, let Mi and M0
i denote the sets of unimprovable beliefs for sender i when pref-
erences are vb and vb0
, respectively. Let M = \iMi and M0 = \iM0
i. Let ~ M = Mj \ Mk and
~ M0 = M0
j \ M0
k. Let ^ f () = E [f (a ();!)] and ^ g () = E [g (a ();!)]. Consider any  2 ~ M.
For any  s.t. E [0] = , we know that  2 ~ Mj implies E
h
^ f (0) + b^ g (0)
i
 ^ f () + b^ g () and
 2 ~ Mk implies E
h
^ f (0)   b^ g (0)
i









 b0 j^ g ()   E [^ g (0)]j.
This last inequality implies E
h
^ f (0) + b0^ g (0)
i
 ^ f () + b0^ g () and E
h
^ f (0)   b^ g (0)
i

^ f ()   b^ g (). Since these two inequalities hold for any  s.t. E [0] = , we know  2 ~ M0.
Hence, ~ M  ~ M0. Therefore, since Mi = M0
i for all i = 2 fj;kg, we know M  M0. This in turn
implies T  T0. By Corollary 1, we know  2 T. Hence, the proposition follows directly from
Lemma 8.
Note that proofs of both Proposition 4 and Proposition 5 rely on the fact that, as competition
increases (whether through adding senders or increasing misalignment of their preferences), the
set of equilibrium outcomes shrinks. This is worth noting since it suggests another way, not fully
captured by the propositions, in which competition increases information revelation. Specically,
T  T0 implies that the set of unimprovable beliefs is smaller when there is more competition;
hence, with more competition there are fewer prior beliefs such that no revelation is an equilibrium
outcome.
Proposition 5 establishes that as preference misalignment b grows, the set of equilibrium out-
comes shrinks and the extent of information revealed in equilibrium increases. A natural conjecture,
therefore, may be that in the limit where two senders have fully opposed preferences, full revelation
becomes the only equilibrium.
Specically, suppose there are two senders j and k s.t. vj =  vk. Does the presence of two
such senders guarantee full revelation? It turns out the answer is no. For example, if ^ vj is linear,
and j and k are the only 2 senders, then Mj = Mk = (
) and any outcome is an equilibrium.
Moreover, it will not be enough to simply assume that ^ vj is non-linear; as long as it is linear along
some dimension of (
), it is possible to construct an equilibrium that is not fully revealing along
that dimension.
Accordingly, we say that ^ vj is fully non-linear if it is non-linear along every edge of (
), i.e., if
for any two degenerate beliefs ! and !0, there exist two beliefs l and h on the segment [!;!0]
such that for some  2 [0;1], ^ vj (l + (1   )h) 6= ^ vj (l) + (1   ) ^ vj (h).
We state Proposition 6 for a more general case of preference misalignment where vj is a positive
ane transformation of  vk.
21Proposition 6. Suppose there exist senders j and k s.t. vj = c   dvk for some c and some d > 0.
If ^ vj is fully non-linear, then full revelation is the unique equilibrium outcome.
The detailed proof of Proposition 6 is in the Appendix. The basic intuition is that, since ^ vj is
non-linear, vj = c   dvk implies that ^ vj () = Vj () and ^ vk () = Vk () can simultaneously hold
only for a belief  that is on the boundary of (
), i.e., on some face of (
). But, since ^ vj
is also non-linear along this face,  must be on the its boundary. Therefore, by induction on the
dimension of the face, any  in Mj \ Mk must be degenerate.
5.4 Does competition make Receiver better o?
Propositions 3, 4, and 5 establish a sense in which moving from collusion to non-cooperative play,
adding senders, and making senders' preferences less aligned all tend to increase information reve-
lation. Since more information must weakly increase Receiver's utility, increasing competition thus
tends to make Receiver better o.
To make this observation more precise, we translate our set comparisons of the informativeness
of outcomes into set comparisons of Receiver utilities. Given two lattices (Y;) and (Z;), a
function f : Y ! Z is said to be increasing if y  y0 implies f (y)  f (y0). Moreover, if the domain
of f is a chain, then an increasing f preserves the set order:
Lemma 9. If f : (((
));%) ! (R;) is increasing, then for any chain C  ((
)),
8T;T0  C, T %s(w) T0 ) f (T) s(w) f (T0).
Proof. First consider the strong order. Consider any y 2 f (T) and y0 2 f (T0). If y  y0, then
y _ y0 2 f (T). Suppose y0 > y. Let  and 0 be any elements of f 1 (y)  T and f 1 (y0)  T0,
respecitvely. Since f is increasing and y > y0, we know 0 > . Hence, since T % T0, it must be
the case that 0 2 T. Hence, y ^ y0 = y0 = f (0) 2 f (T). Now consider the weak order. Given
y 2 f (T), consider any  2 f 1 (y). Since T %w T0 there is a 0 2 T0 s.t.  % 0. Let y0 = f (0).
Since f is increasing, y  y0. Given y0 2 f (T0), consider any 0 2 f 1 (y0). Since T %w T0 there is
a  2 T s.t.  % 0. Let y = f (): Since f is increasing, y  y0.
By Blackwell's Theorem (1953), the function fu : (((
));%) ! (R;), which maps dis-
tributions of posteriors into the expected utility of a decision-maker with a utility function u, is
22increasing for any u. Hence, Lemma 9 allows us to translate the results of the previous three
subsections into results about Receiver's payo.
Corollary 2. Let T be the set of equilibrium outcomes and Tc be the set of collusive outcomes.
Let T and T0 be the sets of equilibrium outcomes when the sets of senders are J and J0  J,
respectively. Let Tb and Tb0
be the sets of equilibrium outcomes when preferences are vb and vb0
,
respectively, where b > b0. For any maximal chain C that intersects T0:
1. Receiver's payos under T \ C are strongly greater than under Tc \ C
2. Receiver's payos under T \ C are weakly greater than under T0 \ C
3. Receiver's payos under Tb \ C are weakly greater than under Tb0
\ C
By the denition of Blackwell informativeness, Corollary 2 applies not only to Receiver, whom
senders are trying to inuence, but also to any third-party who observes the signal realizations and
whose optimal behavior depends on !.21
An alternative to comparing sets of Receiver's payos is to consider a selection criterion that
picks out a particular outcome from the overall set. As mentioned in Section 4, selection criteria that
always pick out a minimally informative equilibrium may be appealing. Under any such criterion,
there is a strong sense in which competition makes Receiver better o. Proposition 3 implies that
any minimally informative equilibrium gives Receiver a weakly higher payo than any comparable
collusive outcome. Propositions 4 and 5 imply that any minimally informative equilibrium with
more senders or less aligned preferences gives Receiver a weakly higher payo than any comparable
minimally informative equilibrium with fewer senders or more aligned sender preferences.
Whether we consider the entire equilibrium set or a particular selection rule, however, our
results apply only to mutually comparable outcomes. This is a substantive caveat. If the outcomes
under more and less competition are non-comparable, it is possible that the outcome with more
competition makes Receiver worse o.
For example, suppose there are two dimensions of the state space, horizontal and vertical.
Senders benet by providing information only about the vertical dimension but strongly dislike
21In the statement of Corollary 2, we do not need to assume that C intersects T
 or T
c because an empty set is
strongly above and below any set and we do not need to assume that C intersects T, T
b, or T
b0
because all these sets
contain   so any maximal chain must intersect them.
23providing information about both dimensions. In this case, competition could lead to a coordina-
tion failure; there can exist an equilibrium in which senders provide only horizontal information,
even though all senders and Receiver would be strictly better o if only vertical information were
provided:
Example 1. The state space is 
 = fl;rg  fu;dg. The action space is A = fl;m;rg  fu;dg.
Denote states, beliefs, and actions by ordered pairs (!x;!y), (x;y), and (ax;ay), where the rst






. Receiver's preferences are u(a;!) = 1
100ux (ax;!x)+uy (ay;!y), where ux (ax;!x) =
2
3Ifax=mg+Ifax=!xg and uy = Ifay=!yg. There are two senders with identical preferences: v1 (a;!) =










is an equilibrium outcome. The set of collusive outcomes, Tc, is the same as the set of equilibrium















. It is easy to see that Receiver is strictly better o under
any outcome in Tc [ T0 than she is under .
6 Applications
6.1 A criminal trial
In Kamenica and Gentzkow (forthcoming), we introduce the example of a prosecutor trying to
persuade a judge that a defendant is guilty. Here, we extend that example to include two senders,
a prosecutor (p) and a defense attorney (d).
There are two states, innocent (! = 0) and guilty (! = 1). The prior is Pr(! = 1) = 0 = 0:3.
Receiver (the judge) can choose to either acquit (a = 0) or convict (a = 1). Receiver's utility
is u(a;!) = Ifa=!g. The prosecutor's utility is vp (a;!) = a. The defense attorney's utility is
vd (a;!) =  a.
If the prosecutor were playing this game by himself, his optimal strategy would be to choose a





that leads 60% of defendants
to be convicted. If the defense attorney were playing this game alone, his optimal strategy would
be to gather no information, which would lead the judge to acquit everyone. Because vp + vd = 0,
24all outcomes in this game are collusive outcomes.
When the attorneys compete, the unique equilibrium outcome is full revelation. This follows
directly from Proposition 6, since vp =  vd and the ^ vi's are fully non-linear. Thus, the set of
equilibrium outcomes is strongly more informative than both the set of collusive outcomes and the
outcomes each sender would implement on their own, consistent with Propositions 3 and 4. In this
example, competition clearly makes Receiver better o.
To make the analysis more interesting, we can relax the assumption that the two senders'
preferences are diametrically opposed. In particular, suppose that the defendant on trial is a
confessed terrorist. Suppose that the only uncertainty in the trial is how the CIA extracted the
defendant's confession: legally (! = 1) or through torture (! = 0). Any information about the
CIA's methods released during the trial will be valuable to terrorist organizations; the more certain
they are about whether the CIA uses torture or not, the better they will be able to optimize their
training methods. Aside from the attorneys' respective incentives to convict or acquit, both prefer
to minimize the utility of the terrorists.
Specically, we assume there is a second receiver, a terrorist organization.22 The organization
must choose a fraction aT 2 [0;1] of its training to devote to resisting torture. The organiza-
tion's utility is uT (aT;!) =  (1   aT   !)
2. The attorneys' utilities are vp (a;!) = a   cuT and
vd (a;!) =  a   cuT. The parameter c 2 [4;25] captures the social cost of terrorism internalized
by the attorneys.23
If the prosecutor were playing this game alone, his optimal strategy would be to choose a signal
that induces a distribution of posteriors
n
1




. If the defense attorney were playing this game
alone, his optimal strategy would still be to gather no information. The unique collusive outcome
is no revelation. To identify the set of equilibrium outcomes, we apply Proposition 2. Panel (a) of
Figure 2 plots ^ vp and Vp. We can see that Mp = fj^ vp () = Vp ()g =
h
0; 1
















panel (c) shows, M = Mp \ Md =
h
0; 1






2 + 1 p
c;1
i
. The set of equilibrium outcomes is
the set of 's whose support lies in this M.
22As discussed in section 3.2, our model is easily reinterpreted to allow multiple receivers.
23If c < 4, the outcome is the same as when c = 0; the preferences of the two senders are suciently opposed that
full revelation is the unique equilibrium outcome. If c > 25, both senders are so concerned about giving information
to the terrorists that neither wishes to reveal anything.
25Figure 2: Characterizing equilibrium outcomes for the criminal trial example







































26Competition between the attorneys increases information revelation. The set of equilibrium
outcomes is strongly more informative than both the set of collusive outcomes (cf: Proposition
3) and than what either sender would reveal on his own (cf: Proposition 4). Moreover, when the
extent of shared interest by the two attorneys is greater, i.e., when c is greater, the set of equilibrium
outcomes becomes weakly less informative (cf: Proposition 5).
6.2 Advertising of quality by dierentiated rms
There are two rms i 2 f1;2g which sell dierentiated products. The prices of these products are
xed exogenously and normalized to one, and marginal costs are zero. The uncertain state ! is a
two-dimensional vector whose elements are the qualities of rm 1's product and rm 2's product.
Receiver is a consumer whose possible actions are to buy neither product (a = 0), buy rm 1's
product (a = 1), or buy rm 2's product (a = 2) . We interpret the senders' choice of signals as a
choice of veriable advertisements about quality.24
There are three possible states: (i) both products are low quality (! = ( 5; 5)), (ii) rm 10s
product is low quality and rm 2's product is high quality (! = ( 5;5)), or (iii) both products are
high quality (! = (5;5)). Let 1 = Pr(! = ( 5;5)) and 2 = Pr(! = (5;5)).
The rms' prots are v1 = Ifa=1g and v2 = Ifa=2g. Receiver is a consumer whose utility depends
on a, ! = (!1;!2) and privately observed shocks  = (0;1;2) :25
u(a = 0;!;) = 0
u(a = 1;!;) = !1 + 1
u(a = 2;!;) = !2 + 2
We assume that the elements of  are distributed i.i.d. type-I extreme value. Senders' expected
24Note that in this setting, our model allows for rms' advertisements to provide information about the competitor's
product as well as their own. This is a reasonable assumption in certain industries. For example, pharmaceutical
companies occasionally produce ads that mention clinical trials that reveal a rival product has unpleasant side-eects
or delayed ecacy.
25As discussed in section 3.2, our model is easily reinterpreted to allow Receiver to have private information.
27payos at belief  are thus
^ v1 () =
exp[E (!1)]
1 + exp[E (!1)] + exp[E (!2)]
^ v2 () =
exp[E (!2)]
1 + exp[E (!1)] + exp[E (!2)]
:
Figure 3 applies Proposition 2 to solve for the set of equilibrium outcomes. Panel (a) shows ^ v1
and ^ v2. Panel (b) shows V1 and V2. Panel (c) shows the sets of unimprovable beliefs M1 and M2
and their intersection M. The set of equilibrium outcomes is the set of 's with supports in M.
Competition between the rms increases information revelation. The set of equilibrium out-
comes is weakly more informative than what either rm would reveal on its own (cf: Proposition 4).
Although not immediately apparent from Figure 3, the set of equilibrium outcomes is also weakly
more informative than the set of collusive outcomes, and is strongly so along chains (cf: Proposition
3). The functional form of senders' utilities does not allow us to apply Proposition 5.
To understand the set of equilibria in this example, it is useful to consider the following two
simpler settings. First, suppose 1 = 0, so the only possible states are ! = ( 5; 5) and ! = (5;5).
In this case, the two rms' preferences are aligned: they both want to convince the consumer that
! = (5;5). The equilibrium outcomes, which one can easily identify by looking at the 2-edges
in panel (c), involve partial information revelation. Next, suppose 2 = 0, so the only possible
states are ! = ( 5; 5) or ! = ( 5;5). Here, senders' preferences are opposed: sender 2 would
like to convince Receiver that ! = ( 5;5), while sender 1 would like to convince the consumer that
! = ( 5; 5). The unique equilibrium outcome, which one can easily identify by looking at the
1-edges in panel (c), is full revelation. This is the case even though each rm on its own would
prefer a partially revealing signal.26 Finally, suppose that 1 + 2 = 1, so the only possible states
are ! = ( 5;5) or ! = (5;5). The rms' preferences are again opposed, and the unique equilibrium
outcome, which one can read o the hypotenuses in panel (c), is again full revelation. This is the
case despite the fact that rm 1 would strictly prefer no revelation.
In the full three-state example, the equilibrium involves full revelation along the dimensions
where senders' preferences are opposed and partial revelation along the dimension where they are
26The gain to rm 2 from increasing 1 is much larger than the corresponding loss to rm 1; for this reason, at the
scale of Figure 3, ^ v1 appears at with respect to 1 despite the fact that it is actually decreasing.
28Figure 3: Characterizing equilibrium outcomes for the advertising example
(a) ^ v functions for senders 1 and 2
(b) V functions for senders 1 and 2




















29aligned. Consequently, the consumer learns for certain whether or not the state is ! = ( 5;5), but
may be left uncertain whether the state is ! = ( 5; 5) or ! = (5;5).
7 Conclusion
In his review of the literature on strategic communication, Sobel (2010) points out that the existing
work on multiple senders has largely focused on extreme results, such as establishing conditions
that guarantee full revelation is an equilibrium outcome in cheap talk games. He remarks that
most of these analyses stop short of fully characterizing the equilibrium set. He also argues that
the existing models do not capture the intuition that consulting more than two senders can be
helpful even if dierent senders do not have access to dierent information.
In this paper, we assume that senders can costlessly choose any signal whatsoever, that their
signals can be arbitrarily correlated with those of their competitors, and that they can send veriable
messages to Receiver. Under these assumptions, we are able to partially address Sobel's concerns.
We provide a simple way to identify the full set of pure-strategy equilibrium outcomes. We show that
under quite general conditions competition cannot reduce the information revealed in equilibrium,
and will in a certain sense tend to increase it. We also discuss the limitations of these results, in
particular the possibility that when outcomes with more or less competition are non-comparable,
competition can actually be harmful to Receiver.
8 Appendix
8.1 Proof of Proposition 1
In both games, Receiver may have multiple optimal actions conditional on her belief. Since the set
of optimal actions does not vary across the two games, however, we take as given some optimal
strategy for Receiver conditional on her belief.
In the observable signal game, let pi 2 () denote sender i's strategy. In the veriable message
game denote sender i's signal-choice strategy by pi and his messaging strategy by i (si). Let 
denote the fully revealing messaging strategy that always reports a singleton.
We rst show that each equilibrium outcome of the observable signal game is also an equilibrium
30outcome of the veriable message game. Suppose that (p1;:::;pn) is an equilibrium of the observable
signal game. Let (v
1;:::;v
n) be the vector of senders' payos in this equilibrium. We wish to show
that ((p1;);:::;(pn;)) is an equilibrium of the veriable message game. Suppose all senders
other than i are playing the proposed strategy. Since (p1;:::;pn) is an equilibrium of the observable
signal game, it is immediate that (pi;) is a best response for sender i. It remains to establish that
 is sequentially rational for sender i following any realization s. Taking other senders' strategies as
given, let G denote the 2-player game between sender i and Receiver. Let Gi denote the subgame
of G that ensues if sender i chooses signal i. Since each i has nitely many signal realizations, a
sequential equilibrium for each Gi exists. Note that sender i0s payo in any sequential equilibrium
of any Gi cannot be strictly greater than v
i . If it were, then sender i would have a protable
deviation in the observable message game and (p1;:::;pn) would not be an equilibrium. Next, note
that for any i 2 Supp(pi) sender i's payo in any sequential equilibrium of Gi cannot be strictly
lower than v
i . If it were, then sender i could protably deviate to  and earn v
i . Hence, we
know there is an equilibrium of G where sender i plays pi and earns v
i : Let ^  be i's messaging
strategy in this equilibrium. At any s, i's payo from playing ^  (s) cannot strictly exceed his payo
from playing : since ^  (s)   (s)8s, his payo would otherwise strictly exceed v
i . Hence,  is
sequentially rational.
We now show that each equilibrium outcome of the veriable message game is also an equi-
librium outcome of the observable signal game. Suppose that ((^ p1; ^ 1);:::;(^ pn; ^ n)) is an equi-
librium of the veriable message game. Let  be the distribution of posteriors induced in this
equilibrium. There is a 1 2  s.t. ((1;);(^ p2; ^ 2);:::;(^ pn; ^ n)) also induces . Moreover,
((1;);(^ p2; ^ 2);:::;(^ pn; ^ n)) must also be an equilibrium of the veriable message game: if (p0;0)
were a protable deviation for sender i from ((1;);(^ p2; ^ 2);:::;(^ pn; ^ n)), it would also be a prof-
itable deviation from ((^ p1; ^ 1);:::;(^ pn; ^ n)). Similarly, there is a 2 2  s.t.
((1;);(2;
2);(^ p3; ^ 3);:::;(^ pn; ^ n)) is an equilibrium of the veriable message game and in-
duces . Dening i in this way for each sender, ((1;);:::;(n;)) is an equilibrium of the
veriable message game and induces . Now, note that (1;:::;n) must be an equilibrium of the
observable signal game: if 0 were a protable deviation for sender i from (1;:::;n) in the observ-
able signal game, then (0;) would be a protable deviation for him from ((1;);:::;(n;))
31in the veriable message. Finally, it is immediate that (1;:::;n) also induces .
8.2 Proof of Proposition 2
Lemma 10. For any sender i and any distribution of posteriors :
^ vi () = Vi ()8 2 Supp() , E0 [^ vi ()]  E [^ vi ()]80 % :
Proof. Consider any i and any  s.t. ^ vi () = Vi ()8 2 Supp(). Consider any 0 %  and
0 such that h0i = 0. For any s s.t. s 2 Supp(), consider the conditional distribution of
posteriors h0jsi. We know Eh0jsi [] = s. Hence, by Lemma 6, Eh0jsi [^ vi ()]  ^ vi (s). Therefore,
E0 [^ vi ()] =
P
s s.t. s2Supp() p(s)Eh0jsi [^ vi ()] 
P
s s.t. s2Supp() p(s) ^ vi (s) = E [^ vi ()].
Conversely, suppose 9s 2 Supp() such that ^ vi (s) 6= V (s). By Lemma 6, we know there
exists a distribution of posteriors 0
s with E0
s [] = s and E0
s [^ vi ()] > ^ vi (s). By Lemma 2, there
exists a 0 s.t. 0
s = h0jsi. Let  be any signal s.t. hi = . Let 00 be the union of  n fsg and
fs \ s0 : s0 2 0g. Then h00i % hi =  and Eh00i [^ vi ()] = p(s)E0
s [^ vi ()]+
P
~ s2nfsg p(~ s) ^ vi (~ s) >
p(s) ^ vi (s) +
P
~ s2nfsg p(~ s) ^ vi (~ s) = E [^ vi ()]
With Lemma 10, it is straightforward to establish Proposition 2.
Proof. Suppose n  2. Suppose ^ vi () = Vi () 8i 8 2 Supp(). By Lemma 1, there is a 
such that hi = . Consider the strategy prole  where i =  8i. Since n  2, we know
that _ i = _. Hence, for any 0
i 2  we have 0
i _  i = 0
i _  D _. Hence, by Lemma
3, h0
i _  ii % h_i. Lemma 10 thus implies Eh_i^ vi ()  Eh0
i_ ii^ vi (): Hence,  is an
equilibrium.
Conversely, consider any equilibrium . Consider any 0 % h_i. By Lemma 5, for any sender i
there exists 0
i 2  such that h0
i _  ii = 0. Since  is an equilibrium, this means Eh_i [^ vi ()] 
[E0^ vi ()] for all i. Lemma 10 then implies that ^ vi () = Vi () 8i 8 2 Supp(h_i).
8.3 Proof of Proposition 6
We build the proof through the following three lemmas.
32Lemma 11. If there exist senders j and k s.t. ^ vj = c   d^ vk for some c and some d > 0, then for
any belief  induced in an equilibrium, for any  s:t: E [] =  we have E [^ vj ()] = ^ vj ().
Proof. Suppose  is induced in an equilibrium. That implies that ^ vj() = Vj () and ^ vk () =
Vk (). Consider any  s.t. E [] = . The fact that ^ vj() = Vj () implies, by Lemma 6, that
E [^ vj ()]  ^ vj (). Similarly, the fact that ^ vk () = Vk () implies that E [^ vk ()]  ^ vk () ,
i.e., that E [^ vj ()]  ^ vj (). Hence, E [^ vj ()] = ^ vj ().
Lemma 12. If ^ vj is non-linear, for any  2 int((
)) there exists a  s.t. E [] =  and
E [^ vj ()] 6= ^ vj ().
Proof. If ^ vj is non-linear, there exist ftg
T
t=1 and weights t s.t.
P
t^ vj (t) 6= ^ vj (
P
t tt). Con-
sider any  2 int((
)). There exists some l and  2 [0;1) s.t.  = l + (1   )
P
tt.
If ^ vj () 6= ^ vi (l) + (1   )
P
t^ vj (t), we are done. So, suppose that ^ vj () = ^ vj (l) +
(1   )
P
t^ vi (t). Now, consider the distribution of posteriors  equal to l with probability
 and equal to belief
P
tt with probability 1   . We have that E [] =  and ^ vj () =
^ vj (l) + (1   )
P
t^ vj (t) 6= ^ vj (l) + (1   ) ^ vj (
P
tt) = E [^ vj ()].
Lemma 13. If ^ vj is fully non-linear, then the restriction of ^ vj to any n-dimensional face of (
)
is non-linear if n  1.
Proof. The denition of fully non-linear states that the restriction of ^ vj to any 1-dimensional face
of (
) is non-linear. For any n  1, every n-dimensional face of (
) includes some (n   1)-
dimensional face of (
) as a subset. Hence, if the restriction of ^ vj to every (n   1)-dimensional
face is non-linear, so is the restriction of ^ vj to every n-dimensional face. Hence, by induction on n,
the restriction of ^ vj to any n-dimensional face of (
) is non-linear if n  1.
With these lemmas, the proof of Proposition 6 follows easily.
Proof. Suppose there exist senders j and k s.t. vj = c   dvk for some c and some d > 0. This
implies that ^ vj = c   d^ vk. Suppose that ^ vj is fully non-linear. Let  be a belief induced in an
equilibrium. Lemmas 11 and 12 jointly imply that  must be at the boundary of (
). Hence,
 is on some n-dimensional face of (
): But, by Lemma 13, if n > 0, the restriction of ^ vj to this
33n-dimensional face is non-linear. Hence, Lemmas 11 and 12 imply that  must be on the boundary
of this n-dimensional face, i.e., it must be on some (n   1)-dimensional face. Since this holds for
all n > 0, we know that  must be on a zero-dimensional face, i.e., it must be an extreme point,
of (
). Hence, any belief induced in an equilibrium is degenerate.
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